DEPARTMENT ON CHURCH AND SOCIETY
DIVISION OF STUDIES - WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES

project papers

ARCHIVES

On the Common Christian Responsibility Toward Areas of Rapid Social Change
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May 1958 No. 15

TWO PAPERS ON THE SOCIOLOGICAL FACTOR IN AREAS OF RAPID SOCIAL CHANGE

I. THE SOCIOLOGICAL CONDITIONS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

By Georges Balandier. (Translated from Politique Etrangère, No. III, 1957 and reproduced with the kind permission of the editor. Professor Balandier is one of the leading sociologists of France and a specialist on the sociology of Africa.)

II. THE SOCIOLOGY OF RISING NATIONS

By Dr. J.Obreski. (Republished from Vol.III, No. 2, International Social Science Bulletin, UNESCO, Spring, 1951. Dr. Obrebski is a Polish sociologist now on the secretariat of the United Nations.)

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I.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL CONDITIONS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

By Georges Balandier

(Translated from Politique Etrangère, No. III, 1957, a special issue on Economic Development and International Cooperation)

The problems of development presented by large parts of the world today are not just economic in nature. Even supposing it were easy to do, it would not be enough to raise the necessary capital and introduce new technological complexes in order to solve these problems at one final stroke. It would still be necessary in the words of the British economist, S.H. Frankel, "to ensure the growth of new aptitudes and new ways of behaving, living and thinking."

It is well to emphasize the fact that an economist has been so careful to draw attention to the importance of the social, cultural and psychological context in which the problems he examines appear. He shows that it is essential to change the human context in order to give the policies of development every possible chance of success.

I can cite specific instances to show that he is not alone in this belief. As long ago as 1951, a report of the International Institute of Public Finance clearly stressed these same aspects. It stated: "The problem of economic development is only in part one of economics and that part (at least in certain cases) is a minor one."

In the same period a group of five experts brought together under the auspices of the specialized agencies of the United Nations undertook to look into the conditions necessary for solving the problems presented by underdevelopment. A good part of their efforts was devoted to the examination of the cultural and social context. This clearly shows that these factors can either play a positive role or be like a brake on progress.

Let me cite a brief passage from their published report: "Economic progress takes place only if the atmosphere is favourable, if the people are eager for progress, and if the social, economic, legal and political institutions are favourable to progress." It goes on to say: "A society will have no desire for progress if it does not realize that progress is possible."

It would be easy to multiply examples which show that the sociologist, when presenting himself alongside other specialists, does not have to justify his right to look into questions which seem at first glance to be primarily of an economic nature.

In what sense, exactly, is his intervention justified?

The Cultural and Psychological Context.

In the first place, I shall call attention to the facts of the cultural and psychological context within which take place all the technical and policy-making activities of economic growth.

1) The countries actually in the course of development embody very "different" civilizations which do not give to the desire for progress and for mastering nature the same importance that we do.

The societies that we call underdeveloped exhibit an undeniable vitality, but this does not necessarily operate in the same way as in our industrial societies. In them the forces for change very often do not aim primarily at an improvement of the material conditions of existence, at a better way of life.

Consequently, it is essential to re-orient the deeper forces of these civilizations. This is practically impossible without effecting a virtual ideological mobilization. I must insist strongly on this point. An American economic historian, A. Gerschenkron, for his part, has stressed the necessity of creating, in his very suggestive expression, a "New Deal of the emotions." Indeed, it is a question of establishing a psychological climate more favourable to progress, of re-orienting the collective effort toward a number of new tasks.

If one stresses this point of view, it is quite understandable that a number of the governments of the nations undergoing development give special importance to the ideological context in which they have to win acceptance for their programmes.

One knows the dynamic role that nationalism plays in these countries, as well as the role played by democratic socialism (Indian Union) and communism (New China) in certain among them.

In this sense an analysis of the ideologies which support economic growth and the social modernization of the countries called underdeveloped seems indispensable.

2) On the other hand, the behaviour and traditional customs of these countries are hardly conducive to an industrial type of life, at least during a period of "transition" of varying length.

I would like, in this connection, to give an elementary example. Until very recently in several African societies, for a worker to engage in industrial activities was primarily considered as a sort of adventure, reserved for young men as a test of strength. This idea was carried to the point that, in certain cases, the fact of going away to work outside the village was viewed as the equivalent of the ancient tests of initiation. This shows the degree to which engaging in an industrial occupation was considered as restrictive and contrary to traditional custom. When such a situation exists, the employer is faced with a labour force singularly mobile, reticent and difficult to train. This explains in part the instability of the labour force and its high turnover. But one must take a closer look at this problem of instability. How explain it? Obviously, primarily by the low level of living conditions: they characterize the majority of Asiatic and African wage-earners.

It is finally necessary to emphasize, for it is by no means negligible, the influence of the social and cultural order. The societies which up to now have had little experience of the industrial type of life are precisely those in which extended family or kinship relations play a considerable role. Away from his kinfolk, the individual may have a feeling of insecurity: he is deprived of the social framework that governs his existence and of the manifestations of solidarity that intervene on his behalf in difficult moments.

On the other hand, one must stress the fact that attachment to the land in these "peasant" milieus -- for it is essentially a question of rural societies -- has a quasi-religious meaning. It is not just a matter of a work-relation between the farmer and the soil he values. There is a consecrated tie.

This means that the individual, away from his village, is separated from the two entities that enfold him most closely and rule his existence: the kinship structure and the system of his work patterns and consecrated ties with the land.

This is true, not only for Africa as instanced above, but also for a part of the Asiatic continent. I offer a quotation about the Indian worker from a writer who specializes in Asiatic problems: "He remains a farmer at heart and when he goes away to work, he is always waiting for the chance of returning to his village."

In Asia at least, the first enterprises of economic modernization were able to recruit their labour forces only from the least favoured social categories: the untouchables and the lowest castes.

3) Finally, there are obstacles which are more specifically psychological.

There is first of all the question of the <u>motivations</u> that induce people to work in enterprises of a modern type. What are the drives and the needs which move an African or Asiatic farmer to engage in a kind of paid work to which he is not accustomed? Touching this problem, it has been observed that workers often seek employment of this kind only to satisfy limited needs: to buy certain imported goods, to save up a "bride price" (this applies in Africa), to meet the expenses imposed by traditional ceremonies and obligatory feasts.

There are thus a limited number of incentives to work in a paid job. It is their insistence on this phenomenon that has led certain writers to note, while greatly exaggerating it, the <u>inelasticity of need</u> for a wage. I only use the formula to show that there is a problem, even if its proportions are falsified.

All these factors contribute to an instability in the labour force which retards economic development because it impedes recruitment and training. The facts that I have just pointed out could be illustrated by examples from Indonesia, Siam and different parts of Africa. This instability, especially to the extent that it works against defining the labour force and organizing it to work in teams on specific tasks in an enterprise, is a cause of backwardness more or less marked in different places and types of civilization.

Under the head of psychological difficulties, I point out the following facts that seem to me particularly significant. Within a number of cultural contexts, any stimuli for one individual to work harder or better than an other just do not exist. This is true of the aboriginal societies of Central and South America in which the idea of competition either does not exist or is condemned. To try to succeed better than such and such a person just is not done. In this situation it is difficult to arouse a spirit of emulation in the matter of job performance.

In societies with equalitarian tendencies, like that of the Indians of Bolivia, the stimulus to personal gain is also almost non-existent. It is forbidden for any individual to pile up income for his sole and exclusive use. In such a situation, the least conforming of the Indians, those who were the most concerned with personal gain, have been forced to leave the country to work elsewhere. It is only by getting a considerable distance away from their traditional milieu that they have the possibility of working and saving for themselves alone.

It must be added that the African or Asian finds a job in the modern sense, notably in an industrial enterprise, very disconcerting for a period of time that may be short or long. It is confusing its rhythm, the hours that it imposes, its fragmentary character if it is a single operation, or, conversely, its heavy demands if it involves using a complicated combination of manoeuvres.

Thus the problem posed by the transfer of a traditional farmer into an industrial environment is one of the most difficult ones to solve. We are already familiar with the difficulties that the Soviet authorities had in making over the "moujik" into an industrial worker. The problem is not new; and it is general, whatever the political regime.

The Social Context.

It is not only traditional ways of thought which are involved the moment one envisages the problems of economic development, but also the system of social intercourse. The transformation of the latter appears to be a precondition for the success of any programme of modernization and training. Here again I quote from S.H. Frankel. He notes in "The Economic Impact on Underdeveloped Countries": "Structural and social transformation is the necessary preliminary in the alleviation of misery, but the cost of change is high, the capital scarce and its fruits slow to ripen." Proof of his first statement may be assembled from many different sources.

After the last war, the Philippines benefited substantially from American aid: capital, investment goods, technicians. Even so, regardless of the volume of this aid, the benefits could not be distributed beyond a very restricted privileged class, precisely because of too rigid a regard for the ancient social structures. The rather limited positive results were also very costly. A balance-sheet was drawn up in an official American document, known as the "Bell Report", which is remarkable for the frankness of its writers. They reached this definite conclusion: "Inequality of income, which has always been pronounced in the Philippines, has been still more accentuated in recent years. While the standard of living of the masses has not yet reached its prewar level, the benefits to businessmen and the incomes of the large landholders have increased considerably."

By contrast, the African government of Ghana was careful to put into effect certain social dispositions as a preliminary to any kind of economic development. It was careful to set up the social conditions most propitious to the success of modernization projects; notably, it promoted the spread of learning and insured the development of technical skills, looking toward the preparation of administrators with a feeling for modern administration. It was careful to go step by step in carrying out this hierarchy of undertakings.

The desire to associate the construction of a new society with the building of a progressive modern economy appears at its height in the countries of Marxist socialism. For these, the two tasks cannot be separated: the march towards socialism and industrialization and the general progress of the economy go hand in hand. It can be said in this connection that New China is a gigantic laboratory whose relative successes and problems we can evaluate here and now. It is an experience decisive for the future of Asia and Africa, and for our own future.

The social problems which demand the attention of those who would promote economic development are obviously many in number.

1) In the first place, there are those of a rural milieu. The villager, in Africa as in Asia, is at once the person most completely wrapped in the swaddling-cloth of tradition and the first victim of technical deficiencies and the inequalities that go with certain modes of landholding.

The questions posed by agrarian reform, rural indebtedness (in 1937 the rural debt of India was the highest then known) and the modern organization of a rural population, are complicated to solve. They call for painstaking analysis before any decision is taken. Such problems present themselves with urgency and sharpness, <u>whatever the chosen method of development</u>: the progress of the rural world lags far behind the progress of urban and industrial centers. This is a cause of very serious difficulties.

Other problems can only be mentioned here, for it is not possible to make an analysis of them in this limited space. Some are those presented by the worker and which concern the development of modern technical skills, the adaptation of an enterprise to local conditions, and the study of the incentives to produce which for a long time remain conditioned by traditional habits and customs.

Other difficulties are due to the conservative spirit of certain social categories. It has been noted that in some societies the feminine population, more attached to traditional ways of behaviour, plays the part of a brake.

It has also been brought out that the growth of a modernizing class playing a dynamic role has been slow. In this connection, some have conceived the myth of a middle class which, in expanding, would create conditions propitious to steady progress.

Still other problems stem from the existence of rigid social barriers: societies with caste systems, for example, as Tibor Mende has emphasized in India, or societies practicing racial discrimination, as shown in studies on South Africa.

The list of these problems could be extended, but in choosing these I want to show that there are aspects of them which call for serious study.

2) Certain writers, like the late sociologist Louis Wirth, have stated that "under-developed peoples are hardly ready to pay for progress with the loss of their souls, that is to say, to abandon their basic traditions." It must be pointed out, however, that these peoples scarcely have the possibility of choosing between progress and traditional conservatism. The die has already been cast.

There are factors, and they exert increasing pressure, which give modernization and economic development the character of inevitability. These factors are easy to enumerate, at least the more obvious of them.

There is first of all the demographic pressure which has been strengthened by the introduction of modern sanitary techniques that are comparatively inexpensive. Faced by such a rapid expansion of Asiatic and Moslem populations, governments cannot remain indifferent. They have to impose new demographic patterns of behaviour and accelerate economic development.

As a second compelling factor, one must take account of the fact that the expansion of modern techniques in the course of the last 20 years has radically upset the traditional economies. What is now needed is to build new economic structures and organizations of a superior type. It is no longer possible to maintain former economic patterns. It is necessary to go ahead.

Finally, a third important factor is the increasingly strong reaction against economic and political dependence. This sentiment must be made use of by Asiatic and African governments in order to facilitate the march of progress. Once political independence is achieved, the accent falls on the winning of "economic sovereignty" without which, according to an Indonesian sociologist, "political sovereignty is empty of all content."

These, then, are so many elements which work together to create an incentive to progress and a need of modernization. While sketchy, these indications suggest, nonetheless, the context in which technical assistance is operative. They show the degree to which such assistance must be guided by previous knowledge of the social milieu which is to receive it, in order that the risks of failure may not be multiplied.

In 1953, a conference was organized by the United Nations to study the "social problems of technical assistance." This gathering made it possible to prepare a veritable "guidebook" on the application and administration of programmes of technical assistance at the local level. Let me note here some of the points examined by the writers.

They called attention to the need for experts to have as great a knowledge as possible of the customs and ways of life of the countries where they operate. This statement may seem a truism but is nonetheless necessary to keep in mind. The writers have emphasized the necessity of foreseeing the repercussions, even indirect, of the decisions taken. This is a result of the preceding condition.

They stress caution in the face of the tendency to ruthlessly substitute imported modern techniques for local ones which are too often hastily dismissed as inadequate and out-of-date. I would say that this warning is particularly important in the realm of agriculture. Here traditional usages embody knowledge which, even in a modern context, should not be disregarded. We are familiar with the conspicuous failures of spectacular experiments in agricultural development: an instance was the labour party's ambitious project to grow peanuts with mechanized production methods in East Africa. It is a good idea to determine what is valuable in traditional technical equipment before planning to impose a radically new technology. Some adaptations are possible, some transitions remain to be made.

The document also suggests that an effort be made to find out the social categories most adaptable to innovations. What social groups, what types of individual, should be utilized to contribute to the spread of the technical changes one wishes to prevail? It may be a political party, as in Ghana, for example, or a traditional assembly orientated toward modern ends. Thus in India the "panchayats", or village assemblies, constituted the chief means of introducing innovations into the countryside. In every case, the choice of persons with prestige in the society to be transformed remains indispensable. This is one of the preliminary problems.

Finally, the writers of the report assert the obligation on the part of the expert in technical assistance to study minutely the reasons for any resistance to innovation.

Success is never 100%; at certain moments there will be expressions of resistance or refusal. Before considering them as a sign of sterile conservatism, it is wise to see if they are not determined by deep-going reasons. Often, it is less a fear of the new techniques introduced than of the risks they represent in their effect on social ties and ways of life.

In this way and through other findings resulting from observations made "on the spot", the New York conference showed the importance of the "climate" in which technical assistance operates. Some participants even brought up the possibility of making use of specialists in public relations to help governments create a favourable opinion toward plans considered desirable. The cooperation of experts of this kind -- supposing that they would be as effective as anticipated -- was considered desirable in order to solve the problem of the difficulty of "communication" between minds.

As long ago as 1949, in a report on technical assistance, the secretary-general of the United Nations did not hesitate to assert that "the inadequacy of technical knowledge constitutes for economic development an obstacle more serious and more immediate than lack of capital." Since this statement, numerous pieces of research devoted to the study of policies of economic growth have <u>all</u> recognized the essential character of technical assistance, and this regardless of the mode of development adopted. The express aims of the Colombo Plan, for example, do not go beyond the Soviet preoccupations with what concerns the Republics of Asia. Faced with such a task, whose importance is so widely recognized, it is wise to give oneself every chance of success. The only purpose of

this discussion has been to reveal certain difficulties and problems attached to the social and cultural context (of economic development.) But we may add a suggestion here. Would it not be better to give up the terms "aid" and "assistance" in favour of "cooperation," in order not to give the countries asking for it any feeling that they are beneficiaries humiliated by a kind of charity given on the international scale?

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II.

THE SOCIOLOGY OF RISING NATIONS

By J. Obrebski

Republished from Vol. III, No. 2. (Spring 1951)
of the International Social Science Bulletin (UNESCO)

The Cultural Revolution of Our Times.

The rise and growth of the new nations is undoubtedly significant and is a powerful factor in the present world crisis. Yet the political aspect of this phenomenon is but one facet of a much wider and more fundamental process. The great revolution of our times consists, perhaps, not so much in the emergence of the new nation-states, as in the formation of the new national cultures and national-culture groups. The new formations do not spring ab ovo, nor do they recapitulate the slow historical process through which our present or past civilizations have come into being. They originate in the interaction of the two types of societies and civilizations, existing simultaneously in the same physical space, frequently within the same political framework, sometimes also under the same ethnic or national designation: the folk-societies or the peasant strata living under the regime of their traditional non-literate culture, and the national culture groups, displaying various sub-types of literate civilization and bound with the corresponding folk-masses either by a political order or a class system, sometimes also by a common cultural substratum. The historical processes by which the new national structures come into being invariably take the form of the expansion and penetration of the national literary civilizations beyond their former confines, of the collapse and disintegration of many folk-societies and of their cultures, of the growth of new civilizational configurations based on formerly non-literate peoples and, finally, of the corresponding transformations of the existing national societies.

The dimensions of this process are in direct proportion to the penetrating influence which our contemporary civilizations exert over all non-literate peoples of the world, and in an inverse proportion to the degree that these peoples or social strata have been made active participants in these civilizations. In the present world, autonomous non-literate societies and cultures are almost non-existent. With very few exceptions they are all drawn into the expanding universe of national civilizations, made dependent upon them and subjected to continuous change. At the same time, the existing civilizations are frequently founded on a very thin

basis. Only few contemporary nations have evolved almost all-inclusive national structures, in which the segments of population that do not share the common literate civilization of the society are few and insignificant. Typical of the remainder of the world is a basic cultural dichotomy, the split of the society into two different social and cultural universes: the literate "national" civilization limited to a small layer of the society, and the folk-culture, embracing the originally non-literate masses. It is the destruction and absorption of the non-literate folk-societies by the national civilizations, and the rise of new social and civilizational structures, precipitated by this process, which constitutes the complex and unstable reality of present times.

The transformations which the folk-societies undergo in this process, take various historical forms. Sometimes they consist in the physical or social annihilation of the indigenous folk-groups and their replacement or absorption by an immigrant population and its civilization. Sometimes again the process assumes the formidable proportions of a full transformation of pre-existing social structures through the rise of new social classes and the growth of new cultural forms originated in these movements. This is what happened in many Eastern European societies, and a similar process is apparently on the way in other parts of the world, including Asia and Latin America. The growth in the Caribbean of new national culture groups from the peripheries of European civilizations and from their slavery systems imposed upon imported African populations, constitutes another variation of this process. Still another configuration comes into existence among the colonial peoples of Africa, where initially it takes the form of the collapse of the traditional tribal societies and the disintegration of the indigenous folk-cultures under the pressure of Western economy and the influence of Western civilization.

The Process of Rising Nations.

Are these different configurations and the transformations they undergo to be interpreted as incommensurable products of history, each explainable only in its own terms? Or can they be scientifically approached as complexes of similar social phenomena, capable of comparative analysis, abstract description and systematic theory? The facts that we know, in spite of all the shortcomings of our knowledge, favour the latter alternative.

First of all, despite the difference in cultural substance and historical detail, these various configurations show a striking structural similarity. This structural similarity is owing to the basic similarity of all folk-societies and of national culture groups. It is determined above all by the nature of interrelations and interactions which develop between the national culture group and the non-national masses, wherever these two collectivities exist as component parts of a bigger whole, such as a nation or a state. Whatever its origin, history and composition, the national culture group, big or small, indigenous or alien, is a dominant group. It is dominant because it represents an organization capable of dynamic development and expansion, exercises a wide control over the political organization of the society and its economic institutions, and evolves group policies and actions

fateful for both moieties of the collectivity. Secondly, its supremacy is founded on an enduring class order, in which a basic class division runs pari passu with the subdivision of the society into two different social and cultural universes. Owing to the fundamental differences in culture, the class stratification of the society becomes at this juncture bimodal and substantial, and the whole social structure takes the shape of a two-class system, particularly in societies where the national culture group is of foreign origin as, for instance, in the colonies.

The inner contradiction between the community principle and the class principle, which is found in any national society, becomes particularly emphatic under the class-and-culture dichotomy, and it circumscribes the course taken by the processes of assimilation of one group to another. The national culture group, in its activities directed towards the assimilation of the folk-society, displays two opposite tendencies. In the drive for expansion, continuity and self-realization it proceeds to assimilate and incorporate into its structure the individual members of the folk-groups and the folk-society as a whole. However, in defence of its inner organization, directive functions, cultural composition, and system of values, it evolves mechanisms of stratification and segregation, which relegate the new segments of the whole to an inferior class position and allow them to participate in the national society on a reduced scale, socially and culturally.

Hence the cultural assimilation of the folk-society to the national culture group frequently is accompanied by the processes of social dissimilation. The absorption of the folk-society by the national culture group, particularly if this group is a disproportionate demographic minority, does not take the form of a mass transition of the individuals from one group to another. It operates through the class-and-culture dichotomy, and the penetrating action of the institutions of the national culture group on the folk-society results not only in a cultural unification of the collectivity, but also in its segregation on the class principle. Subsequently, there emerge new derivative social structures and new cultural configurations. The clash between the assimilatory and dissimilatory processes paves the way for a specific historical process: the growth of the folk-society to cultural nationhood, not through the submission to the value systems, supremacy and guidance of the dominant group, but through a selective assimilation of its culture. This involves the rejection of class meanings and of the values inherent in them, and the formation, in strife and opposition to the dominant group, of a new national structure free from the former cleavages and contradictions.

The Phases of National Growth.

Not every folk-society reaches this final stage of national growth, and the rate and incidence of the transformations differ from one society to another. Reduced to a general abstract description, this complex and varied process seems to be characterized by the following phases:

The initial phase, which starts with the penetration of the institutional and associational framework of the national culture group into the folk-society, consists in the assimilation of the elements of the national civilization by the folk-groups, and in their adaptation to the traditional culture pattern and social organization of these groups.

Although this process is complex and varied, since the folk-society is divided into a number of self-contained communities and local groups, and each group has to undergo this process separately and independently; it presents definite structural similarities. First of all, the external imports, whether cultural values, patterns of social roles, or even institutions, change their original function and meaning in the readjustments they undergo when transplanted from one type of society and civilization to another. Secondly, the infiltration of external institutions and value systems into the folk-groups is accompanied by the disorganization of the traditional community. Finally, the penetration of some institutions of the national culture group into the folk-society and even their partial assimilation by the local groups, does not bridge the cultural chasm of the bipartite society. The folk-society, as a result of this process, is made dependent upon the organization and activities of the national culture group: directly, in the functioning of the newly adopted institutions and, indirectly, even in the perpetuation of its revised culture pattern. This establishes a permanent link between the national culture group and the folk-society, but does not signify their fusion. The original dichotomy does not disappear. On the contrary, it receives a new emphasis. The differences in the type of culture still persist between the two moieties of the collectivity and, integrated into the hierarchical order of the society, they contribute to the crystallization of its two-class system.

The next important phase is represented by a reverse process: not by the assimilation of the national institutions and culture patterns by the folk-society, but by the processes of assimilation of the folk-groups and its members to the national culture group and its institutions. It is at this juncture that the dissimilatory processes, rooted in the class system of the collectivity, start to take shape.

The folk-society has on the whole no place in the original structure of the national culture group and little or no share in its history. The national group is indifferent, sometimes even hostile to the cultural forms and values of the folk-society, although it may appreciate them as a source of artistic inspiration or as a common substratum of national mythology. The concept of wider unity which it eventually evolves usually takes for granted the division of the collectivity into a passive folk and an active national stratum. In the eyes of the national group, the folk-society is viewed as a collective value not because of its culture, but rather in spite of it. It is considered not as an active subject of the national group, but as an object of its acculturation activities and as an instrumental value: a reservoir of man-power to be utilized for the development of the national resources, human and material. Only in so far as they repudiate their original cultural background and master fully the personal patterns indispensable for membership in the national culture stratum, are the individuals of the folk-society given full entry into the national culture group. For the vast majority of the partially assimilated, participation in the civilization of the national culture group is circumscribed by the status and positions assigned to them, as also to members of the folk-stratum, in the subordinate layer of the class structure of the collectivity.

Operating within this culture-and-class dichotomy the institutions of the national culture group produce two-fold effects: they detach, physically and spiritually, the members of the folk-society from their

own group and they reject them from the full participation in the national culture group. Whether it is class or caste spirit, or simply a cultural ethnocentrism, this spirit permeates, intentionally or non-intentionally, the teaching involved in the acculturation conducted through the institutions of the national culture stratum. Once subjected to the permanent influence of these institutions, the members of the folk-society are, consciously or unconsciously, indoctrinated in admiration for the traditions, values and achievements of the dominant group and instilled with a negative evaluation of their own society and tradition. They become severed from their native group, disentangled from their original loyalties, estranged from their traditional values, and made to wander, physically and spiritually, through social spaces other than the narrow world of their village community or tribal society. They change and become remodelled, but at the same time they do not enter the restricted stratum of the national culture group, which was instrumental in their detachment from their own society. Rather, they are somewhere in between the two worlds, in new formations, arising around the focal points of the expanding institutional scaffolding of the national society. These new formations take various forms. The detribalized natives, migrant labourers, uprooted peasants, the élite noire, a native compound or an urban slum are obvious examples. But they exist also less obviously, in spiritual detachment from the community which is not necessarily accompanied by change of residence. The participants in these new aggregates may be found among the Christian converts of a pagan tribe, a village proletariat, dissatisfied youth, various categories of innovators, non-conformists and rebels.

The growth of these marginal formations introduces the first important structural changes in the collectivity. These changes do not affect directly the original composition of the national culture group and they may leave intact many local communities of the folk-society. They consist mainly in the emergence of new social groupings in various interstitial areas which have been formed by the invasion of the institutions of the dominant national group into the folk-society. Such groups are founded on the identity or similarity of these new social roles and of the functions performed by its members, for which there is no place in the traditional organization of either folk-groups or the national culture group. These amorphous and fluid bodies, derived from the interaction between the national culture group and the folk-society, cut across the segmentary structure of the folk-society. They develop new social spaces, super-local, in which the members of the folk-stratum aggregate not as members of their local communities, but as the members of a wider, "super-territorial" national community.

These structural changes are the prerequisites of the final phase of the process of rising nations. They provide the basis for the development of the group-forming processes, which lead to the emancipation of the folk-strata from their dependence upon the dominant group, to the formation of their own super territorial associations and institutions and, finally, to the growth of a new, and more inclusive, national structure.

In this final phase, the most significant structural occurrence is the emergence of various social movements, aiming at such changes in the folk-society and in its derivative formations, and also in the national structure, which would enable the folk strata to participate more fully in the national civilization. These movements take various forms:

economic, religious, political, cultural. They are creative and constructive, and their enduring contributions to the growth of the new society proceed through: the formation and spread of institutions and associations binding the folk-society as a whole or its derivatives with the national community; organized action aiming at a more extensive assimilation of the national civilization with a simultaneous rejection of its class meanings and values; the development of the indigenous leadership both in the wider society and in the local community; a development of class and national consciousness and of the corresponding ideologies; increased cultural creativeness, manifested particularly in literature and art, expressing the new philosophies of the new national strata and the latter's search for their own social ideals and value systems. With the development of these movements the folk-society starts to disappear gradually as a separate entity and enters the reorganized national structure as a recipient of its cultural heritage and as a co-maker of its historical existence.

The Methodological Considerations.

This tentative outline of the process of rising nations points undoubtedly to one fact. The transformations originated in the symbiosis of national civilizations and folk-societies do not consist, as it is frequently assumed, merely in an adjustment of the folk-society to new conditions, in a transitory disequilibrium of various local folk-groups, overcome as soon as these local groups reorganize their cultural inventory in a way more compatible with the pressures and requirements of the new situation. Historically and sociologically, the focus of this process is the growth of a new social reality, which belongs neither to the folk-society nor to the original national society, although it is related to both of them. It is the study of this chaotic, fluid and dynamic reality which calls for the attention of both sociologists and anthropologists and for their co-operation.

At present only the studies of ethnic or national minorities receive the full attention of sociologists and, owing to the close affinity of their problems to the problems of assimilation of folk-societies by national civilizations, such studies contribute indirectly, both in theory and method, to the study of rising nations.

Anthropological research has not advanced much beyond the study of the initial phase of the process. The fact that the growth of this new reality, in spite of its richness and complexity, and also in spite of its obvious existence, has escaped an adequate study, is due largely to the inadequacy of anthropological perspective and concepts applied in actual research. Anthropological studies of culture change are dominated by a historical perspective and a methodological concretism. Anthropologists appear to ignore the distinction between non-literate and literate civilizations; hence their preference for psychological theories and interpretations of culture change. They fail to notice that the main problem lies in the transition of the folk-society from one type of civilization to another, and that this transition takes place not in the local groups, but between and in-between the two different types of society. They seem also to be unaware of the fact that even the fullest account of all the changes that have occurred in a community studied has little significance unless these changes are brought into their relevant context: the interaction which develops between the national culture

group and the folk-society, and the nation-forming processes precipitated by this interaction. The anthropological "tempero-centrism" too, deplored by Bierstedt, with its emphasis on phenomena accessible directly to personal observation of a visiting anthropologist, has undoubtedly been somewhat responsible for the fact that the historical nature of the process and its temporal and spatial dimensions have been overlooked.

Is this complex, dynamic and elusive reality inaccessible to anthropological inquiry? Has it to be passed to the sociologists perhaps in the anticipation of the final transformation of the folk-societies into the full-blooded national civilizations? By no means. A more adequate theoretical approach and the use of existing methods can open this new field to anthropological study, advance the further development of this science, and lead it to a more fruitful co-operation with sociology.

The success of the inquiry in detecting, recording and describing the processes of change depends directly upon the theoretical concepts applied in the study. In this respect the anthropologist has to rely as much on the relevant elements of sociological theory as the sociologist has to rely on the contributions of anthropology in testing and developing these theories. The most neglected and controversial parts of systematic sociology, such as the theory of nation, of social class, social personality, social space, and social processes and movements, can profit much by anthropological findings in the field of rising nations. Again, their development towards greater conceptual clarity and methodological precision is indispensable for the success of the anthropological study.

The reorientation of the study calls certainly for a corresponding adjustment in the methods and techniques of research. The anthropologist should abandon his methodological concretism and realize that the growth of the new super-local structures and functions should receive higher priority than the study of the changing customs and habits of the local groups. Accordingly, community studies should be used not only as an objective per se, but above all as a method of detecting and analysing the nation-wide structural changes in their local manifestations. Finally, a much more extensive and confident use should be made of the autobiographical method.

The growth of the new personality type and structures, going side by side with the group-forming processes, escapes the grasp of the scientist if his vision is confined to the microcosmos of a local community. In the transforming folk-society, the local community does not exist any more as a self-contained and coherent social and cultural environment. Its members are exposed to multiple, differentiated and evasive formative influences. The new part of their social personality, and also its new structure, cannot be detected unless it is studied by following their movements in the wider social space, which starts to take shape and expand with the nation-forming processes in which they participate. It is the autobiographical method that enables the anthropologist to extend his intimate insight into society beyond the range of his direct contacts and observations and leads him to the discovery and perception of the phenomena which are out of his reach and hence capable of escaping his notice.

The study of the rising nations conducted on these lines opens new prospects for the anthropological study of society, as promising and rich as is the social and cultural reality involved in this process.